Chapter 3

SOVIET APPROACHES TO MUSLIM EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM

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There is no doubt that during the Cold War, the intelligence services of the Soviet Union maintained contacts with terrorist groups. For instance, the KGB[1] provided nationalist and leftist terrorist groups such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) with funds, training and arms.[2] This was hardly surprising, since these terrorist groups were political organizations that remained more or less aligned with the ideological goals of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Ever since 1919, when Vladimir Lenin arranged for the creation of the Comintern,[3] the CPSU had, when necessary, relied on clandestine means to keep in touch with ideologically linked political organizations elsewhere. By maintaining relations with them, Moscow ensured Soviet access to their leaders, some of whom in time emerged as presidents of established or newly independent states. For reasons of practicality and deniability, the links were often maintained by Soviet intelligence. Besides, Soviet intelligence could use the leftists with whom links were established as sources of information. If nothing else, such informers would be able, and willing, to report on their rivals. Some might also have been able to provide valuable intelligence on the countries in which they were active.

None of the aforementioned Palestinian terrorist organizations was motivated by Muslim extremism, even though they had all emerged in Muslim countries. Their key defining ideology, beyond leftism, was nationalism. This begs the question of whether Soviet intelligence also maintained links with extremist organizations motivated by Islamic ideals, such as those groups that had begun carrying out terrorist operations already in the Cold War and, in the twenty-first century, grew into arguably the most serious terrorist threat to the Western world and secular society. In most cases, the Soviets did not.

On Soviet territory, it will be shown, the security organs realized already during the civil war that followed the Russian Revolution that at times, they could use what they termed 'revolutionary Islam' as a means to fight the traditional Sufi brotherhoods, which were perceived to be the greater threat to the Soviet state.

However, direct support essentially ceased during the Second World War, even though their radical Islamic ideology was retained and incorporated into the Soviet state structures in Muslim-majority union republics. From the early 1970s, the Soviet security organs were aware of the existence of Muslim extremism, and of its general hostility towards the Soviet, atheist ideology. However, it was treated as purely a domestic security matter.

From a foreign intelligence perspective, the Soviet services had little to gain from contacts with such groups. Besides, the focus of Soviet foreign intelligence was far more traditional, with an emphasis on foreign governments, leftist organizations and the subversive activities of the intelligence services of other countries. For obvious reasons, the Soviets were also more attuned to finding support among Marxists and others of 'progressive' political orientation than among religious extremists.

The domestic security approach to Muslim extremism – Sufi Islam versus revolutionary Islam

Both in the Soviet Union and in the Western world, the real threat from Islam to Soviet power was identified in the Sufi brotherhoods that for centuries had dominated Islam in the Caucasus and Central Asia.[4] It was the Sufi *Naqshbandiyyah* order, which in the nineteenth century had led the Muslim resistance against Russian rule in the Caucasus, under leaders such as Imam Shamil (1797–1871).[5] In Central Asia, the situation had been similar. The resistance of the Tekke Turkmen tribe at Gök-Tepe in 1861 was led by another *Naqshbandi*, Kurban Murat.[6] When revolts among Muslims occurred in the Tsarist Russian Empire, the politically powerful Sufi brotherhoods almost invariably played a leading role. The Andijon revolt of 1898 was led by a *Naqshbandi*, Muhammad Ali (Madali, also known as Dukchi Ishan).[7] The early Soviet leaders had confronted the same problem during the 1918–20 Civil War, when certain Sufi leaders had also been involved in the *Basmachi* revolts in Soviet Central Asia, from 1918 onwards (including Junaid Khan, who probably was a *Naqshbandi*), and the first Daghestani and then Chechen uprisings in the Caucasus from 1924 onwards.[8] Pan-Turkism had played a role as well. During the First World War, the Russian government had noted that Turkish agents were active in the Muslim regions of the empire.[9] Then the former war minister of Ottoman Turkey, Enver Pasha (1881–1922), had assumed a prominent role among the *Basmachi* insurgents until he was killed in battle. However, the revolt ultimately failed, and many *Basmachi* migrated into Afghanistan, from where their leaders continued to threaten the Soviet power in Central Asia.[10]

Based on the experiences of the revolts in Soviet Central Asia and in the Caucasus, the Soviet leaders searched for an alternative vision of Islam for their many Muslim subjects. Their goal was the enlistment of 'revolutionary Islam' on the side of the Soviet power, against the conservative Muslims who might oppose Soviet socialist rule. When the Daghestani communists wrote the history of the Soviet conquest of the Caucasus, they drew the conclusion that 'a war against conservative Muslim insurgents must be conducted by revolutionary Muslim units or, at the very least, with the assistance of such units'.[11]

Revolutionary Muslims were found among those who, for one reason or another, were opposed to the Sufi interpretation of Islam. Most such Muslims were influenced by the Muslim reform movement of the late nineteenth century, which in time came to develop into the Islamic modernism now generally known as Salafism or Wahhabism. Several such groups and preachers joined the Bolsheviks in the revolution and the civil war. One such group was the Vaisite sect, founded at Kazan in 1862 by Bahauddin Vaisov. The group, the membership of which mainly consisted of artisans, seemingly combined Sufi mysticism, Salafi puritanism, extreme nationalism and, after 1907, Marxist socialism. In 1917, the son and successor of the sect's founder, Inan Vaisov, accepted weapons from, and allied the sect with, the Kazan Bolsheviks. In 1918 he was killed, fighting for the Bolsheviks.[12]

Another revolutionary Muslim was Shami Domullah al-Tarablusi ('The Syrian cleric from Tripoli', born around 1867–1870), a native of Tripoli in present Lebanon who was active in the period 1919–32 when he fought Sufism apparently on behalf, or at least in support, of the Bolsheviks in Central Asia, motivated by Salafi ideology.[13]

The belief in revolutionary Islam was also expressed in Soviet foreign policy. When in January 1926 Ibn Saud declared himself king of Hijaz, the Soviet Union, on 16 February 1926, was the first state to recognize him.[14] Saudi rule depended on the Wahhabi religious ideology. This was a radical interpretation of Sunni Islam, often referred to as Salafism, which advocated a return to the practices of the time of the Prophet Muhammad. The Saudi interpretation of Islam favoured armed jihad as a means of spreading Saudi rule and the uncompromising Wahhabi religious ideology. When the Soviet press reported the Soviet recognition of Saudi Arabia, it also labelled the Wahhabi political system an 'extraordinarily interesting political-social programme'.[15] Soviet–Saudi diplomatic relations were maintained until 1938, when the Soviet mission in Jeddah was closed and diplomatic relations severed.

The early Bolsheviks and Soviet leaders supported Salafi thought because the proponents of Salafism backed the Soviet attempts to destroy traditional Caucasian and Central Asian Sufi Islam and its holy places. The Bolsheviks regarded this as a means to prevent Sufism from becoming a rallying point against Soviet rule. As such, Sufism would have been dangerous due to its popular appeal, mass following and potential for mobilization.[16] After a few brief, failed attempts to eliminate religion altogether, the Soviet rulers concluded that a key threat to state control rested in popular Islam, which they believed almost exclusively consisted of Sufism and depended on Sufi leaders, some of whom might set themselves up as rival authorities to the state structures. As a result, the Soviet rulers tried to channel the religious aspirations of the Muslims into directions acceptable to the state by appointing and controlling a small number of state-controlled *ulama* (clergy).

Except for a few periods, the Soviet authorities generally sought to promote atheism and discourage religion, not to eradicate religious faith as such. Faith was,

at times, even a quality of use to the Soviet state, such as during the Second World War. Besides, a key aspect of the Marxist ideology was the stubborn belief that religion would disappear by itself. In 1944, 1945 and in most years from 1953 onwards, the Soviet authorities organized *Hajj* pilgrimages to Mecca in Saudi Arabia. They also began to send a few young Muslims to the Islamic centres of learning in the Middle East, including several that had grown increasingly extreme in their interpretation of Islam. Upon their return, the pious young Soviet clerics were appointed leaders of the official Spiritual Directorates, through which the Soviet state and the Communist Party attempted to control religious sentiments among the Muslim population. Their first decrees typically included the abolition of traditional Sufi customs, the demolition of Sufi shrines, and the purification of Islamic practices to make the faith, in their eyes, more pure.[17] An example was the official *mufti* (Islamic leader) in Central Asia in the period between 1957 and 1982, Ziyauddin Khan Ishan Babakhanov (1908–1982), who had been trained in Saudi Arabia in 1947–8.[18] Babakhanov was not the only Soviet cleric who advocated Salafi beliefs. Another case was a newly appointed *imam-khatib* (cleric who conducts the Friday sermon and prayer) in Leningrad at the very end of the 1960s or in the early 1970s, a recent graduate of the official Soviet Mir-e Arab seminary in Bukhara, who forbade women from participating in funerals and proclaimed that it was a sin to go to the theatre.[19] And even before Babakhanov became mufti, in 1956, there was a suggestion that religious textbooks, by this time presumably of an extremist nature, should be imported from Egypt for use in the Mir-e Arab.[20]

To a large extent, the young Salafi Soviets succeeded. Not in propagating Salafism among the Muslim masses, because these grew increasingly secular under Soviet rule. But they succeeded in eradicating many popular varieties of Sufi Islam, and they supported the Soviet security apparatus when it destroyed the traditional Sufi brotherhoods in the fear that these might mobilize a Muslim opposition to Soviet rule. These worries still haunted the Soviets. By the 1950s and 1960s, Soviet scholars and officials began to express concern that the Sufi brotherhoods, including offshoots from the *Naqshbandiyyah*, seemed to have made an unexpected comeback. This was worrying; the Soviets knew that Sufi leaders formerly had wielded considerable influence over the Muslim masses and that Sufi spiritual activities could not easily be controlled by the state.[21]

For this reason, the Soviet security organs continued to keep an eye on the possible existence of Sufi brotherhoods. Information in the Mitrokhin archive, a collection of handwritten notes made in secret by KGB archivist Vasiliy Mitrokhin who subsequently brought them with him when he defected to the West, shows that in certain areas and during certain periods in the 1960s, the Soviet security and intelligence service KGB did, indeed, carry out operations against Sufi brotherhoods.[22] However, in most cases they adopted a live-and-let-live attitude, as long as Sufi activities did not break Soviet law too blatantly.[23]

Instead, a more insidious problem emerged. As a result of the close links forged with the Middle East, both through the Spiritual Directorates and through the practice of receiving Arab exchange students, many of whom were young and influenced by extremist religious views already upon their arrival in the Soviet

Union, Salafi extremism in the late 1960s gained a following among young, educated Soviet Muslims who deemed official Soviet Islam insufficiently radical. From the 1970s onwards, the exchange students included missionaries from the Middle East belonging to extremist organizations that originally grew out of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.[24] Soon underground mosques, led by radical and charismatic young preachers, emerged in Soviet cities. Their supporters did not share the communist view that religion was a mere phase through which the religiously inclined would pass before the attainment of communism. The underground, parallel form of Islam was firmly opposed to the Soviet vision of a state-sponsored Islam in support of the Soviet state.[25]

Following the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in December 1979, it slowly dawned upon the KGB leaders that foreign Muslims too might pose a threat. In September 1981, the Politburo adopted a resolution proposed by the KGB on 'measures to counter attempts by the adversary to use the Islamic factor for purposes hostile to the Soviet Union'. A month later, KGB chairman Yuri Andropov approved a First Chief Directorate (foreign intelligence) directive that ordered the KGB's foreign residents to carry out offensive active measures against hostile Islamic forces abroad and to expose their links to Western intelligence. A First Chief Directorate plan was drawn up to counter attempts by the West to use the Islamic factor against the Soviet Union.[26] Linked to developments in Afghanistan but also Syria, this was apparently the first time that Soviet foreign intelligence began to take a serious interest in Muslim extremism. In Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood was engaged in a terrorist campaign against the Syrian government and its Soviet advisors. On 5 October 1981, yet another such terrorist attack took place. As a direct result of this attack, the KGB within days asked its allies for intelligence on the Muslim Brotherhood.[27]

In its work, the KGB regarded the Muslim Brotherhood as essentially any other terrorist group, focusing on its leaders, organization and activities. By April 1982, the KGB had noted that the Muslim Brotherhood was a religious-political organization with the goal of saving Islamic societies from the destructive influence of Western civilization and causing the rebirth of Islam, and that it enjoyed the support of Saudi Arabia. However, since the organization also existed in Western Europe, in particular in Britain and Germany, the KGB concluded that it enjoyed the support of the Western intelligence services as well, principally in its struggle against the Afghan and Syrian governments. With regard to Afghanistan, it was in particular the United States, Pakistan and China that supported groups with links to the Muslim Brotherhood.[28] The KGB also provided a reference report on the Muslim Brotherhood and its activities in various countries in the Middle East as well as in the West. The report described the 'total unity' of the organization's and Saudi Arabia's ideological goals, but noted that Jordan, Kuwait, Iraq, the United States, Britain and Germany, too, were primary sponsors of the Muslim Brotherhood. The report noted that the organization posed a threat to Soviet representatives and advisors in several countries. Perhaps not fully realizing the Sunni–Shia divide, the KGB also argued that Iran hoped to use the Muslim Brotherhood to export its Islamic revolution to the Arab world.[29] The KGB's allies too contributed

intelligence. A subsequent Czechoslovak report provided details on the history and activities of the Muslim Brotherhood. A hodgepodge of fact and bazaar rumours, the report recognized the Salafi ideology of the organization but, oddly, added allegations about Oxford and Cambridge universities and the freemasons as having been instrumental in its formation. The report also argued that since around 1952, British intelligence had supported the Muslim Brotherhood, indeed, being its 'spiritual father' and first supporter, and that since 1953, the organization had established links with Israeli intelligence. Yet the report also noted the strong presence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Western Europe, where it had by then established several new branches under different names. Taken as a whole, the report was perhaps indicative of how foreign intelligence approached the issue of an extremist organization. The report included snippets of history, names of high-level leaders and what apparently were translations of Muslim Brotherhood documents – but little that could be used to combat its activities on the ground.[30]

The foreign intelligence approach – little interest in Muslim affairs

The previous lack of interest in Muslim extremism within Soviet foreign intelligence becomes clear from an examination of Soviet activities in Afghanistan, a country that had presented a threat to the Soviet Union from pan-Islamic activities since the very beginning of Soviet political power. Soviet intelligence had run agents in Afghanistan already in the period up to and including the Second World War, for which purpose it had established a residency in Afghanistan's capital Kabul. Previously, Soviet intelligence had maintained a representation in Maimana, near the Soviet–Turkmen border. When a residency was established in Kabul in or around 1930, it was the Soviet intelligence chief in Maimana, who was appointed resident. From 1930 to 1934, the residency of the Soviet security and intelligence service in Kabul was subordinated to the OGPU[31] in Tashkent. By the early 1930s, there was also a residency in Mazar-e Sharif near the Soviet–Uzbek border. From October 1935, the Kabul residency was directly subordinated to the Fifth Department of the GUGB, as the Soviet intelligence service OGPU had been renamed in 1934.[32]

Soviet intelligence in Afghanistan primarily concerned itself with political developments in Afghanistan as well as work against the activities of the British, Japanese and, in time, German intelligence services in Afghanistan.[33] Still, anti-Soviet Muslim groups, some of them extremist in nature, did pose a threat to the Soviet Union. A key problem for the Soviet power in Central Asia was the anti-Bolshevik *Basmachi* revolt, which broke out in the Ferghana Valley in 1918. Although the *Basmachi* had been defeated in the plains by 1923, fighting continued until 1928 in the mountains and until at least 1936 in the Turkmen steppes. The Afghans made contact with the *Basmachi* and sent agents, mullahs and troops into Soviet territory.[34] In 1925, Soviet OGPU units retaliated by seizing Urta-Tagay, an island in the Amu Darya on the border with Afghanistan, which had become a *Basmachi* base. The OGPU units remained until August 1926, when a treaty

of neutrality and mutual non-aggression was signed between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Moscow had by then ceded its claims to Urta-Tagay).[35]

OGPU would soon again have to deal with Muslim insurgents in Afghanistan. One source of information to the Soviets may have been the future king, Muhammad Nadir Khan (1883–1933), who, Soviet intelligence claimed, had been 'drinking vodka with the chekists[36] of the Kabul trade representative's office'. The chronology for this claim remains unclear, since Nadir Khan spent the latter half of the 1920s in Paris. However, following King Amanullah's forced abdication in January 1929 in response to a rebellion, Nadir Khan reportedly entered into an agreement with the Soviets, through the OGPU chairman Vyacheslav Menzhinskiy (1874–1934) and the head of INO OGPU[37] Mikhail Trilisser (1883–1940), that the Soviets would send military support against the rebels. As a result, in April 1929 a former Cossack commander named Vitaliy Primakov (1897–1937) led a primarily Soviet expeditionary force into Afghanistan. Ostensibly subordinated to the Afghan ambassador to Moscow, Ghulam Nabi (d. 1932), the Soviet–Afghan force captured Mazar-e Sharif and other places in northern Afghanistan. However, they failed to gain popular support, and Moscow recalled the force, which returned in June 1929.[38]

The threat to the Soviet power from Muslim insurgents was not over yet. In spring 1930, Moscow again sent OGPU units into Afghanistan, this time to a distance of a hundred kilometres. Their target was the *Basmachi* group of Ibrahim Bek (1889–1931). Moscow only recalled the force when Nadir Khan, having succeeded Amanullah as king under the name Nadir Shah, went to Moscow, where he signed a treaty of mutual friendship and non-aggression in June 1931.[39] The *Basmachi* group of Ibrahim Bek was subsequently destroyed through a plan hatched by the new Soviet residency at Mazar-e Sharif. In 1931, Ibrahim Bek was enticed to leave Afghanistan for Soviet Tajikistan, where he was cornered and killed by OGPU units.[40]

It is thus clear that the OGPU in Tashkent, and its subordinate residencies in Afghanistan, dealt with Muslim insurgents. However, they did so from a counterinsurgency perspective. Besides, if the religious affiliation of the Central Asian insurgents was taken into account at all, they were regarded as conservative Muslims inspired and led by the Sufi brotherhoods. From a Soviet perspective, they should be suppressed, not relied upon for intelligence on other states, nor groomed as future leaders.

Perhaps for these reasons, it is noteworthy that the key interest of Soviet foreign intelligence in Afghanistan was not Muslim insurgents but political developments and the activities of foreign powers. For instance, the official history of the Russian foreign intelligence service describes how one such informer, a beautiful and talented lady of Polish origin known as Maryam who was active from 1935 onwards, was a key source of information on activities and opinions within the Afghan government. Having lost her first husband during the Russian Civil War, she began to work for Soviet intelligence in Tashkent. She married an Afghan diplomat, Azizurrahman Fathi, which enabled her to report on Afghan activities in Tashkent, then followed her new husband to Kabul when he returned home. It

turned out that Azizurrahman Fathi's brother was Ali Muhammad (*c.* 1893–1977), who served as Afghanistan's minister of foreign affairs in the period from 1939 to 1952. Ali Muhammad too fancied Maryam, and when Azizurrahman Fathi died 'under unclear circumstances' (as the official history put it), Maryam became Ali Muhammad's unofficial wife. Ali Muhammad subsequently became a deputy prime minister and, in 1963, minister of court under King Zahir Shah. This position gave him considerable influence in Kabul. Besides, Zahir Shah liked Maryam's Russian cooking. Maryam was also an obstetrician, and in this capacity she was consulted by Zahir Shah's wife. Maryam remained an active and useful source for Soviet intelligence at least into the 1960s. Ali Muhammad's service as minister of court ended in 1973, when Zahir Shah was ousted in a coup, led by Muhammad Daud.[41] Another source was known as Salih, who served Soviet intelligence for forty-two years. During this time, Salih worked in various capacities within the Afghan Foreign Ministry, including as head of the cipher section. Salih eventually recruited three informers and handed them over to the residency.[42]

The same pattern of Soviet foreign intelligence activities continued throughout the Cold War. Soviet intelligence focused on Afghan politics and the activities of foreign intelligence services, not Muslim extremism and terrorism.[43] Soviet intelligence personnel in Afghanistan was also the focus of foreign intelligence services, including those of China.[44] The Soviets were successful. Nur Muhammad Taraki, the Marxist leader of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which overthrew and killed President Muhammad Daud in April 1978, had been a KGB informer since 1951. Babrak Karmal, whom the Soviets put into power in December 1979, had been recruited by the KGB probably in the mid-1950s.[45] Taraki and other Afghan informers had provided intelligence on Daud's 1973 coup, so it had come as no surprise to the Soviets.[46]

The Soviet war in Afghanistan

On 27 April 1978, a coup by leftist military officers of the PDPA under Taraki overthrew Daud and killed him as well as all members of his family. There is no evidence that the Soviets were behind the planned coup, despite rumours to this effect. For formal reasons, neither the Soviet ambassador nor the chief Soviet military advisor had retained contacts with the PDPA during the Daud government. As with leftist political organizations in other countries, it was KGB officers, who had maintained links with the Afghan Marxists. However, by all accounts none of the co-conspirators informed their KGB contacts about what they were planning.[47] Apparently the KGB learnt of the planned coup only immediately before it took place.[48]

When KGB informers came to power, as it happened in Afghanistan, the KGB had to change the nature of its relationship with the informer. The latter would then cease his previous activities, instead becoming what the KGB referred to as a trusted contact or, in case of a head of state or government, a special unofficial contact. Henceforth, Taraki and the others continued to provide assistance to the Soviet Union, but they did so within limits chosen by them, not the KGB.[49] A formal KGB connection was eventually established. The Taraki government requested KGB support from the Soviet Union on 8 May 1978, and a KGB representative office was established in Kabul on 30 June 1978. Its first head, KGB Col. Leonid Bogdanov, arrived on 2 August. The representative office remained until early 1992.[50]

There had been a previous Afghan intelligence and security service, known merely as *Istikhbarat* ('intelligence').[51] By the 1970s, it was extremely ineffective and not much trusted by the Afghan leaders, who relied more on personal connections.[52] However, because of the coup that brought the PDPA into power, and the vastly increased degree of repression introduced to keep the new government in power, a new organization was needed. For this reason, Taraki established a security service named AGSA with the help of the Soviets in September 1978, led by Asadullah Sarwari.[53] Following the 1979 coup d'état by Hafizullah Amin, in which Taraki was murdered, Amin changed the name of the security service to KAM. It was led in short succession by Sarwari's cousin Aziz Ahmad Akbari and Amin's cousin Asadullah Amin.[54] Both AGSA and KAM, which were subordinated to the minister of the interior, primarily engaged in the arrest, torture and extrajudicial execution of those perceived to be enemies of the PDPA government.[55]

The excesses of the Amin government led to the Soviet military intervention and a coup in December 1979, which brought Babrak Karmal to power. Karmal disbanded the infamous KAM. Instead, a group of some 1,200 'activists' belonging to Karmal's faction of the PDPA, under the direction of Dr Muhammad Najibullah and Dr Baha, worked from December 1979 until March 1980, with Soviet support, to establish a new intelligence service.[56]

On 10 January 1980, Karmal formally established the KhAD, which until 1985 was led by Najibullah.[57] Baha was put in charge of a special counterinsurgency unit.[58] At first responsible to the minister of the interior, KhAD was detached from the Ministry of the Interior within months and transformed into a directorate-general within the Office of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, that is, the office of the head of state. KhAD was subdivided into six or more directorates, responsible for various intelligence and security activities.[59] KhAD, too, was heavily engaged in torture and extrajudicial executions, but unlike its predecessors, which to a considerable extent, perhaps primarily, operated against potential rivals within the government, KhAD had to spend significant efforts fighting insurgents inside and outside the country due to the intensifying civil war. There were also two separate security functions, a 'military KhAD' (KhAD-*e Nezami*), which formed part of the Ministry of Defence and functioned as a military security service, and a 'KhAD-*e Pulis*' within the Ministry of the Interior, which was responsible for security within the ministry and police.[60]

KhAD was upgraded to a ministry on 9 January 1986 and renamed WAD. WAD remained in existence until the fall of the Najibullah government in 1992. The service, which apparently came to include both the military and police KhAD, consisted of three directorates-general: the Directorate-General for Security, the

Directorate-General for Military Security and the Directorate-General for the Interior.[61]

The Soviet services provided support to the KhAD and its successor WAD during the entire Soviet war in Afghanistan. However, the KGB residency in Kabul, perhaps surprisingly, retained its previous focus on political intelligence and the activities of the Western services. While some Soviet sources, such as Vasiliy Mitrokhin's notes, refer to KGB penetration of insurgent mujahidin bases in Pakistan, there is little or no evidence to back up these claims. Such penetration took place, but as will be shown, these operations were in most cases run by Afghan, not Soviet, intelligence, even if the latter may have taken credit for them or at least given Mitrokhin this impression. The possibility also remains that Mitrokhin exaggerated the power of his former employer, since his notes were written with a view to defect to the West.[62]

Afghan intelligence activities

As always in intelligence work, it took time to build the capability that KhAD needed. In January 1980, the service had only 700 employees,[63] a number which during the same year rose rapidly to several thousand. Still, information on the mujahidin remained very sketchy. From 1981 to 1983, KhAD relied primarily on SIGINT, the monitoring of the mujahidin radio communications. This was difficult, however, since radio reception conditions vary widely in Afghanistan depending on the terrain.[64] For this reason, KhAD also strived to establish HUMINT networks. By late 1982, KhAD had established networks almost throughout the entire country. By the summer of 1983, KhAD had deployed 1,300 informers within mujahidin units, 1,226 informers along the communications lines, 714 informers in the underground political organizations, and twenty-eight informers in Pakistan.[65] From this time onwards, KhAD had amassed such a level of experience and information that even mujahidin sources admitted that KhAD had a 'quite detailed and exact picture' of the mujahidin movement.[66] Soviet KGB officers in Afghanistan agreed with this assessment, acknowledging that KhAD had essentially complete information about the mujahidin groups and their agents.[67]

It was accordingly KhAD that ran agents within the Pakistan-based Islamic parties and the *mujahid* units, and, indeed, within the Pashtun tribes as a whole.[68] At a time when KhAD had twenty-six informers in Pakistan with access to the *mujahid* parties, fifteen of them were members of the Pakistani armed forces, intelligence community and bureaucracy.[69] For KhAD, Pakistan was a key target, since it was Pakistan that supported and supplied the majority of the Afghan insurgents. For this reason, KhAD also gave sanctuary to and supported terrorist groups operating in Pakistan. Such groups included Al-Zulfikar, a leftist group formed by Murtaza Bhutto (1954–1996), the elder son of the executed Pakistani politician Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928–1979), and separatist groups in Baluchistan and Sindh.[70] While this activity has been interpreted as KhAD acting as a mere surrogate for the KGB,[71] this seems to be an overly expansive interpretation. KhAD had its own reasons, and capabilities, for dealing with armed groups hostile to the government in Islamabad.

KhAD was generally quite effective in establishing links with rural villages in Afghanistan. KhAD operatives tended to work in their native regions, where they could make good use of ethnic and kindred links. They were, also for this reason, often very good at negotiating agreements with local mujahidin groups when a ceasefire was needed.[72] During combat operations, KhAD supplied Soviet forces with valuable intelligence and support, including guides.[73] During the first half of 1982, more than 450 air and artillery attacks against mujahidin units were carried out on the basis of KhAD intelligence. During the first three months of 1983, 140 air attacks were based on KhAD intelligence.[74] Without such support, the Soviet forces would have been far less efficient. KhAD may also have created fake mujahidin units to provoke clashes among genuine mujahidin units, to alienate the population from the mujahidin and to establish precedence by surrendering to the government at an opportune moment.[75]

In time, KhAD established a foreign intelligence directorate. KhAD residencies were established in Pakistan (Quetta, Peshawar, Islamabad, Karachi), Iran (Tehran, Mashhad, Chaman), India (Delhi, Bombay), West Germany (Bonn), Turkey (Ankara) and Kuwait (Kuwait City). However, KhAD had to rely on Soviet ciphers and communications through the Soviet residencies. A major concern of the KhAD residencies was to report on Afghan émigrés and the activities of the intelligence services of the United States, China and the Muslim countries.[76]

Soviet intelligence activities

The successes of Afghan intelligence officers should not be interpreted as their Soviet counterparts doing nothing. The Soviet 40th Army, which operated in Afghanistan, included a KGB component from the outset.[77] Besides, Mitrokhin's notes suggest that some KGB special forces units, especially the *Kaskad* ('Cascade') units, successfully made contacts with mujahidin leaders who were then persuaded to take up arms against their former associates, and that *Kaskad* units were also engaged in the creation of fake mujahidin units.[78] The KGB organization *Kaskad* was set up by Andropov on 11 July 1980 and served in Afghanistan from 15 August 1980 onwards. The members of these teams called themselves *kaskadery*, a word deriving from *cascadeur*, French for stuntman. They had the important task of training their Afghan counterparts. In addition, the *Kaskad* units carried out military special forces operations, often with an emphasis on acquiring targeting data for air strikes.[79]

From late 1980, Afghan intelligence also received support from the Soviet Interior Ministry's *Kobal't* ('Cobalt') special forces teams. Since the Interior Ministry was responsible for law enforcement, these teams, first formed in the summer of 1980, consisted of law enforcement officers with experience in criminal investigations. They supported Afghan intelligence in counterterrorism with regard to work with informers. As with the *Kaskad* units, the focus was on training their Afghan counterparts. However, some *Kobal't* officers also ran informers

within mujahidin groups, although the focus was again on military intelligence, with an emphasis on the current location of enemy formations. Some informers were recruited in prisons and prison camps.[80]

Other special forces units belonged to Soviet military intelligence, the GRU.[81] Intelligence officer Lieutenant Alexander Kartsev, who served in Afghanistan from 1986 to 1988, belonged to a motor-rifle regiment but had been trained by the GRU. He has related how he maintained connections with a certain Shafi, an Afghan informer who had studied in Oxford and Japan and presumably worked for renowned mujahidin leader Ahmad Shah Masud.[82] Military intelligence officers like him were at times able to gather intelligence from sources within the mujahidin. Certainly such officers met with Afghan informers with information on mujahidin groups and at times also the leaders of such groups, when the latter contemplated changing sides or a ceasefire agreement.[83] Some have suggested that in comparison with the KGB, which expected quick results from their sources, the GRU worked with a long-term perspective, expecting a new source to bring the return on the investment made in it only in the medium and long run.[84]

Another KGB special forces unit that served in Afghanistan, from 1983 to 1984, was *Omega*. This unit was reportedly engaged in an operation in Pakistan, which resulted in the car bomb assassination of a *mujahid* leader and two of his bodyguards.[85] However, it remains possible that this operation was handled by KhAD, with KGB support, and not by the KGB alone. Certainly other, similar operations in Pakistan were, as noted, carried out by Afghan intelligence.[86] As with the *Kaskad* special forces units, a key task of *Omega* was to gather intelligence for air strikes against mujahidin groups, and the unit prepared such targeting data for 1,500 air strikes.[87]

Soviet reassessment of the domestic threat from Muslim extremism and terrorism

The Afghan war and the conflict in Syria gradually changed the Soviet perception of the threat from Muslim extremism and terrorism. This can be illustrated by the different levels of attention devoted to the threat in the 1970s and the 1980s. When in 1970 the security organs in Tashkent determined that a Salafi group was recruiting followers and had been doing so since the late 1960s, they responded only slowly. The devotees of the new sect did not really break any laws and they were few in number, even though they caused trouble by arguing that the official religious authorities issued instructions that deviated from true Islam. They also demanded the universal observance of the five daily prayers and opposed the secondary and higher education of girls. It was only in late 1972 or early 1973 that the security organs realized that somebody would have to deal with the sect. They conducted a house search, during which they found and confiscated illegal religious materials. The members of the sect were cautioned that they would be prosecuted, if they

continued their activities (which was a common way of addressing the problems of unregistered religious activities).[88] And this, the authorities hoped, would be the end of the matter.

Before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, KGB officers stationed in the country regarded the Afghan Sufi brotherhoods as a particularly dangerous enemy.[89] While a fundamentally correct assessment with regard to the situation in Afghanistan, after the 1979 intervention they soon realized that this was not the whole story. Islamic extremists of the Salafi variety were as dangerous, if not more so. The same reassessment took place sometime later on the domestic scene in the Soviet Union as well. Following the intervention in Afghanistan, the local KGB in some Soviet cities in due course began to monitor the, for them, new and unexpected threat from underground Salafi groups. Serious problems were first discovered in Tajikistan, which shared a border with Afghanistan. In 1983, a group of twenty-two unregistered clerics, aged twenty-two to forty-five, in Kulob (then Kulyab) Oblast in Tajikistan came to the attention of the Soviet authorities. They called themselves Wahhabis and studied what Soviet officials referred to as documents advocating pan-Islamic ideas.[90]

During an investigation in 1986, the law enforcement organs in Tajikistan found a large volume of religious literature hostile to the Soviet system. A major part of the literature had been smuggled across the border, presumably from Afghanistan and possibly with the help of American and Pakistani intelligence.[91] At around this time, some Tajik Salafis crossed the border to join the Afghan mujahidin,[92] in effect becoming the first Soviet jihadist foreign fighters.

As a result, in 1986 the Tajikistani security organs took action against the extremists, dozens of whom were arrested and sentenced to imprisonment.[93] This did not come too soon. On a number of occasions from about December 1986 to April 1987, combat teams from the Afghan *Hezb-e Islami* group crossed the Amu Darya into Tajikistan to attack Soviet security forces there.[94] These combat teams included, in 1987, Soviet jihadists as well – the first returning foreign fighters.[95]

Conclusions

From the outset, the Soviets assessed that there was a threat from Islam and that it derived from the Sufi brotherhoods. Sufi Islam was a domestic security threat, a phenomenon to be identified and suppressed, and not a source of intelligence on other targets, especially not foreign ones.

At an early stage, the Soviets assessed that what they called revolutionary Islam – currently better known as Salafism or Wahhabism – could be harnessed as a tool to fight the Sufi brotherhoods. Some Salafi preachers and ideas were accordingly cultivated as a means to combat Sufism. The dangers inherent in Salafism were overlooked, and it was only during the 1970s that it slowly began to dawn upon the Soviets that Salafism, at least by then, was the far more dangerous security threat to the Soviet state.

When the Soviets encountered Muslim extremist groups motivated by Salafism in Afghanistan, Soviet intelligence set out to collect intelligence on these groups that could be used to combat them. However, for linguistic and other reasons, most of this intelligence work was carried out by Afghan intelligence, which the Soviets trained and organized for this purpose. It was Afghan intelligence that infiltrated mujahidin groups, primarily inside Afghanistan but also in Pakistan, the regional centre for Salafi jihadist activities. Occasionally, the Soviets claimed credit for successful intelligence operations against mujahidin targets. However, the available evidence suggests that it was the Afghans who did most of the work. There is no evidence to suggest that Soviet intelligence, during the war in Afghanistan, maintained friendly links to, or cooperated with, Salafi groups, either in Afghanistan or elsewhere, for purposes beyond the occasional need to negotiate ceasefire agreements with individual mujahidin leaders. It thus follows that it was the Afghans, not the Soviets, who ultimately decided questions on which methods to be used, including torture, assassinations and similar ways and means of warfare against existential threats. This does not absolve Soviet intelligence from responsibility for acts of violence, since they trained and supported Afghan intelligence; however, it is unlikely that the Soviets were in a position to decide which means would be used, except in extraordinary cases. It was also Afghan, not Soviet, intelligence that provided support to leftist or separatist terrorist groups in Pakistan. Such groups were not motivated by Salafi ideology, and they had other reasons to oppose the Pakistani state.

For these reasons, it can be concluded that during the Cold War the Soviet Union, although not adverse to providing support for, and cooperation with, terrorist organizations motivated by leftist ideology, had neither motive nor intention to support foreign jihadist terrorist organizations. Nor did Salafi groups solicit the support of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, it was only Western intelligence, which supported jihadist groups, and then in most cases with the intention to fight the Soviets. At home, the Soviet security organs reacted only slowly to the growth of domestic Salafism. Lingering memories of the idea that revolutionary Islam could be used to combat Sufism seem to have prevented the Soviet security organs from realizing that domestic Muslim extremism derived from the same ideology as the phenomenon with which the Soviet state was at war in Afghanistan and which carried out terrorist attacks against Soviet advisors in Syria. When Tajik jihadists crossed the border into Afghanistan to join the war against the Afghan government and its Soviet backers, they were among the very first Western foreign fighters. And when in 1987 some of the Tajik foreign fighters returned to attack targets in their native Soviet Union, they not only became the first returning Western foreign fighters but simultaneously also the first Sunni jihadist terrorists in the Western world, to which the Soviet Union surely belonged as regards ideology and culture.

It remains a sad paradox of history that both the Soviets, from the Russian Revolution, and, somewhat later, the Western intelligence services supported radical Salafism. The Soviets aimed to use Salafism against domestic Sufi Islam, while the Western services used it against Soviet power in Afghanistan. Both

failed to foresee the consequences of their actions, which remain visible in the contemporary struggle against jihadist terrorism in Europe and elsewhere. In comparison, the Afghan intelligence and security service appears to have had a better understanding of the threat, and of how to address it; however, its methods were typically harsher than would be palatable in the Western world. Besides, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Afghan intelligence did not have the resources to withstand the well-funded and well-supplied jihadist groups that operated out of Pakistan.

Notes

1 KGB was the acronym for *Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti* (Committee for State Security), the name of Soviet intelligence from 1954 to 1991.
2 Christopher Andrew and Vasiliy Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB and the World* (London: Allen Lane, 2005), 143–5, 246–55, 257–8.
3 Comintern was the English term for the *Kommunisticheskiy Internatsional III, Komintern* (Third Communist International), a Moscow-led international organization that advocated the overthrow of existing governments and the creation of an international Communist state.
4 Michael Fredholm, The First Jihadists, published in a forthcoming book with the proceedings of the 2015 conference *In the Shadow of the Cold War* held in Biala Rawska, Poland (Warsaw: IPN, 2020).
5 Moshe Gammer, *Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the Conquest of Chechnia and Daghestan* (London: Frank Cass, 1994).
6 Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Mystics and Commissars: Sufism in the Soviet Union* (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1985), 32.
7 Edward Allworth (ed.), *Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian Dominance, A Historical Overview* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994), 167–9.
8 *Basmachi*, originally a Soviet propagandistic term, derives from Uzbek *basmach*,'bandit'.
9 Sergey G. Rybakov, Na pochve obshchey dlya nikh religiii—islama, in D. Yu. Arapov (ed.), *Imperatorskaya Rossiya i musul'manskiy mir: Sbornik statey* (Moscow: Natalis, 2006), 468–77, here 471. Rybakov (1867–1922) was an expert on Islam at the Ministry of the Interior. His article was first published in 1917.
10 Bennigsen and Wimbush, *Mystics and Commissars*, 26–8, 35; Aleksandr I. Pylev, *Basmachestvo v Sredney Azii: Etnopoliticheskiy srez (vzglyad iz XXI veka)* (Bishkek: Kyrgyzsko-Rossiyskiy Slavyanskiy Universitet, 2006), 218–20. See also Michael Fredholm, *The Great Game in Inner Asia over Two Centuries* (Stockholm: Stockholm University, 2004), 28.
11 Alexandre Bennigsen, *The Soviet Union and Muslim Guerrilla Wars, 1920–1981: Lessons for Afghanistan* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1981), 23; citing Najmuddin Efendiev-Samurskiy (First Secretary of the Daghestan Oblast Committee), *Dagestan* (Moscow, 1924) and *Grazhdanskaya voyna v Dagestane* (Makhachkala, 1925), and A. Takho-Godi, *Revolyutsiya i kontrrevolyutsiya v Dagestane* (Makhachkala, 1927).
12 Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967), 54, 243 (note 6); Vitaly V. Naumkin, *Radical Islam in Central Asia: Between Pen and Rifle* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 17.

13 Bakhtiyar M. Babadzhanov [Babajanov], Ashirbek M. Muminov and Martha Brill Olcott, Mukhammadzhan Khindustani (1892–1989) i religioznaya sreda ego epokhi (predvaritel'nyye razmyshleniya o formirovanii 'sovetskogo islama' v sredney Azii), *Vostok (Oriens)* 4 (September–October 2004), 43–59, here 53; Naumkin, *Radical Islam*, 40–1. Shami Domullah first came to Tashkent from Peking in February 1919, having spent fifteen to twenty years in Eastern (Chinese) Turkestan where he was a strong proponent of Salafi Islam. Martha Brill Olcott, *Roots of Radical Islam in Central Asia* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007), 9. Shami Domullah (full name Sa'id ibn Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Bakhid ibn 'Ali al-'Asali al-Tarablusi) was arrested in 1932 and died, most likely, in internal exile at some point after 1940.

14 Alexei Vassiliev, *The History of Saudi Arabia* (London: Saqi, 1998), 265.

15 Stephen Page, *The USSR and Arabia: The Development of Soviet Policies and Attitudes towards the Countries of the Arabian Peninsula* (London: Central Asian Research Centre, 1971), 17; citing *Novyy Vostok*, 1925.

16 Vitaly V. Naumkin, *Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan* (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, Working Paper, 2003), 17; Naumkin, *Radical Islam*, 39–43, 52.

17 Michael Fredholm, *Islam and Modernity in Contemporary Central Asia: Religious Faith versus Way of Life* (Stockholm: Stockholm University, 2007), 29–31, 34–6.

18 Bakhtiar Babadzhanov [Babajanov], Islam in Uzbekistan: From the Struggle for 'Religious Purity' to Political Activism, in Boris Rumer (ed.), *Central Asia: A Gathering Storm?* (London: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), 299–330, here 306.

19 Yaacov Ro'i, *Islam in the Soviet Union: From the Second World War to Gorbachev* (London: Hurst & Co., 2000), 282. He was not alone. On mullahs in the Ferghana Valley who early on advocated Salafi beliefs, for example, that it was a sin to listen to the radio when music was broadcast, see ibid., 250.

20 Ibid., 587 (note 140).

21 Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union*, 180–1; citing *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 2 (1957), 60–72; *Nauka i religiya* 7 (1965), 22–3; and *Nauka i religiya* 9 (1965), 85–6.

22 Andrew and Mitrokhin, *Mitrokhin Archive II*, 373–4.

23 Ibid., 377.

24 The KGB noted some 300 foreign students in the Soviet Union since 1977 who were members of the Muslim Brotherhood, including in military schools, and contacts between them and the embassies of Jordan, Sudan, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq. See Secret report on the Muslim Brotherhood, 20 April 1982 (translated from Russian), in IPN BU 2394/598. Bulgarian intelligence, too, noted Muslim Brotherhood activity among students in the socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. See secret report on a Muslim Brotherhood conference in Istanbul, 17 December 1987 (translated into Russian), in IPN BU 0 449/32/7. Files from the archives of the Institute of National Remembrance (*Instytut Pamięci Narodowe*, IPN), Poland, kindly made available by Przemysław Gasztold-Seń.

25 Fredholm, *Islam and Modernity*, 39–40.

26 Andrew and Mitrokhin, *Mitrokhin Archive II*, 379.

27 Secret request to Poland for information on the Muslim Brotherhood, 8 October 1981 (translated from Russian), in IPN BU 2394/598. Similar requests were also almost certainly made to other Warsaw Pact states, since documents in the IPN archive include translations of subsequent reports on the Muslim Brotherhood from at least Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. See IPN BU 0 449/32/7.

28 Secret report on the Muslim Brotherhood, 20 April 1982 (translated from Russian), in IPN BU 2394/598.

29 Secret reference report on the Muslim Brotherhood, received in Poland on 22 April 1982, in IPN BU 0 449/32/7.

30 Top-secret study of the Muslim Brotherhood, 6 December 1982 (translated from Czech), in IPN BU 0 449/32/7.

31 OGPU was the acronym for *Obyedinennoye Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravleniye*, the name of Soviet intelligence from 1923 to 1934.

32 Yevgeniy M. Primakov (ed.), *Ocherki istorii rossiyskoy vneshney razvedki*, vol. 3 (Moscow: SVR and Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 2016), 201, 202. The chapter was written by Major-General L. P. Kostromin, who was deputy head of the KGB representative office in Kabul during the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 1979–1989. GUGB was the acronym for *Glavnoye Upravleniye Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti*, the name of Soviet intelligence from 1934 to 1941, when it formed part of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, NKVD (*Narodnyy Kommissariat Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti*).

33 Primakov, *Ocherki istorii*, vol. 3, 202.

34 Bennigsen, *Soviet Union and Muslim Guerrilla Wars*, 1 (note 1).

35 Valeriy V. Malevanyy, *Sovetskiy spetsnaz v Afganistane* (Moscow: Kuchkovo pole, 2009), 81–4.

36 The common Russian expression for security service personnel.

37 INO was the acronym for *Inostrannyy otdel* (foreign department), which dealt with foreign intelligence.

38 Malevanyy, *Sovetskiy spetsnaz*, 85–6; Sir Rodric Braithwaite, *Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979–89* (London: Profile, 2011), 29; citing A. Lyakhovskiy and S. Davitaya, *Igra v Afganistan* (Moscow, 2009), 64; J. Bruce Amstutz, *Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1986), 14, with references.

39 Malevanyy, *Sovetskiy spetsnaz*, 87.

40 Primakov, *Ocherki istorii*, vol. 3, 201; William S. Ritter, 'The Final Phase in the Liquidation of Anti-Soviet Resistance in Tadzhikistan: Ibrahim Bek and the *Basmachi*', 1924–31, *Soviet Studies* 37/4 (1985), 484–93; William S. Ritter, 'Revolt in the Mountains: Fuzail Maksum and the Occupation of Garm, Spring 1929', *Journal of Contemporary History* 25 (1990), 547–80.

41 Primakov, *Ocherki istorii*, vol. 3, 202–3.

42 Ibid., 203.

43 In the mid-1950s, Soviet military intelligence reportedly sent a group of fifty-six agents from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan into Afghanistan, with orders to carry out operations against the United States and its allies in Afghanistan in case of war. However, two of them turned themselves in, and the attempt failed. Vladimir Snegirev and Valeriy Samunin, Virus 'A': Kak my zaboleli vtorzheniyem v Afganistan, *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, 2011, 220–1. The title translates to 'Virus A: How we got infected by the invasion of Afghanistan'. Available in English as Vladimir Snegirev and Valeriy Samunin, *The Dead End: The Road to Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: National Security Archive, 2012), http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB396/Full%20Text%20Virus%20A.pdf (accessed 1 January 2020). Page numbers refer to the English-language edition. Retired KGB colonel Valeriy Samunin arrived in

Afghanistan in 1975 and served for more than seven years as a foreign intelligence officer with the Kabul residency, while historian and journalist Vladimir Snegirev wrote the first investigative stories about the war in Afghanistan published in the Soviet Union (in *Komsomol'skaya pravda* and *Rossiyskaya gazeta*). Samunin described his own experiences in the book under the fictitious name Valeriy Starostin. See, for example, Vasiliy Mitrokhin, *The KGB in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper 40, 2002), 77.

44 Larisa Kucherova, *KGB v Afganistane* (Moscow: Eksmo, 2009), 256–7.

45 Mitrokhin, *KGB in Afghanistan*, 19–20; Andrew and Mitrokhin, *Mitrokhin Archive II*, 386, 387.

46 Mitrokhin, *KGB in Afghanistan*, 25.

47 Braithwaite, *Afgantsy*, 37, 39, 41–2.

48 Snegirev and Samunin, *Virus*, 7–9.

49 Mitrokhin, *KGB in Afghanistan*, 34 (note 54).

50 V. S. Khristoforov, *KGB SSSR v Afganistane 1978–1989: K 20-letiyu vyvoda sovetskikh voysk iz Afganistana* (Moscow: Moskovskiye uchebniki i Kartolitografiya, 2009), 4–5, 20. The representative office appears to have been in operation only from August 1978 onwards. See Mitrokhin, *KGB in Afghanistan*, 31. Details on how the intelligence relationship was established can be found in Snegirev and Samunin, *Virus*, 120–30, 202–6, 227–9. Among those who served within the KGB representative office was KGB colonel Alexander Mareychev, who arrived in Afghanistan in May 1978 and became a department head within the representative office in autumn 1979.

51 The KGB used the term Istikhbarat as the code name for the acting head of the service, which suggests a certain level of cooperation. See Mitrokhin, *KGB in Afghanistan*, 30.

52 Snegirev and Samunin, *Virus*, 122.

53 Mitrokhin, *KGB in Afghanistan*, 31; Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Asylum and Migration Division, *Security Services in Communist Afghanistan (1978–1992): AGSA, KAM, KhAD and WAD* (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 26 April 2001, DG H I 7953/01), 7. AGSA was the acronym for *Da Afghanistan da Gato da Satane Adara*, Pashto for 'Organization for the Protection of the Interests of Afghanistan'.

54 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Security Services in Communist Afghanistan*, 8. KAM was the acronym for *Da Kargarano Amniyati Muasasa*, Pashto for 'Workers' Security Service'.

55 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Security Services in Communist Afghanistan*, 14.

56 UNHCR, Note on the Structure and Operation of the KhAD/WAD in Afghanistan 1978–1992, UNHCR, May 2008, 2.

57 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Security Services in Communist Afghanistan*, 9–10; UNHCR, *Note on the Structure and Operation*, 2. KhAD was the acronym for *Khadamat-e Atala'at-e Dawlati*, Dari for 'State Intelligence Service'.

58 Kucherova, *KGB v Afganistane*, 36.

59 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Security Services in Communist Afghanistan*, 14; UNHCR, *Note on the Structure and Operation*, 2–3. Directorates were known as *reyasat* in Dari.

60 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Security Services in Communist Afghanistan*, 15; UNHCR, *Note on the Structure and Operation*, 3.

61 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Security Services in Communist Afghanistan*, 4, 10, 15. WAD was the acronym for *Wazarat-e Amniyat-e Dawlati*, Dari for 'Ministry of State Security'.

62 Mitrokhin, *KGB in Afghanistan*, 119, 143, 149; Andrew and Mitrokhin, *Mitrokhin Archive II*, 410. Mitrokhin wrote his Afghanistan manuscript in 1986–1987, based on notes that he copied from the archives of the KGB First Chief Directorate in Yasenevo outside Moscow before he retired in 1984. Mitrokhin claimed that his notes were based exclusively on KGB information and, where possible, this seems corroborated by other evidence. Since Mitrokhin's ultimate intention was to defect to the United States or Britain, and the Afghanistan manuscript was his ticket out, he consistently, and possibly excessively so, characterized KGB activities as pervasive and a negative influence.

63 Mitrokhin, *KGB in Afghanistan*, 141.

64 Antonio Giustozzi, *War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan, 1978–1992* (London: Hurst & Co., 2000), 187–8.

65 Ibid., 98.

66 Ibid., 187.

67 Kucherova, *KGB v Afganistane*, 74.

68 S. N. Lebedev (ed.), *Istoriya rossiyskoy vneshney razvedki: Ocherki*, Vol. 6 (Moscow: SVR and Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 2016), 128, 129. In Russian terminology, the term agent may refer to either an officer of the intelligence service or a recruited informer.

69 Mitrokhin, *KGB in Afghanistan*, 145; Andrew and Mitrokhin, *Mitrokhin Archive II*, 360.

70 Mitrokhin, *KGB in Afghanistan*, 142, 147; Andrew and Mitrokhin, *Mitrokhin Archive II*, 358–60.

71 Andrew and Mitrokhin, *Mitrokhin Archive II*, 360.

72 Giustozzi, *War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan, 1978–1992*, 43, 44, 127.

73 Aleksandr Sukholesskiy, *Spetsnaz GRU v Afganistane 1979-1989 gg.* (Moscow: Russkaya panorama, 2012^3), 124.

74 Mitrokhin, *KGB in Afghanistan*, 143.

75 Giustozzi, *War, Politics and Society*, 99.

76 Mitrokhin, *KGB in Afghanistan*, 145.

77 Khristoforov, *KGB SSSR v Afganistane*, 23.

78 Mitrokhin, *KGB in Afghanistan*, 119, 143, 149; Andrew and Mitrokhin, *Mitrokhin Archive II*, 409.

79 Khristoforov, *KGB SSSR v Afganistane*, 35–6; Malevanyy, *Sovetskiy spetsnaz*, 172–3. However, *Kaskad* units also carried out HUMINT operations dealing with informers against mujahidin bands. Malevanyy, *Sovetskiy spetsnaz*, 182–3, 191, 192; Kucherova, *KGB v Afganistane*, 10.

80 Kucherova, *KGB v Afganistane*, 11–12; Malevanyy, *Sovetskiy spetsnaz*, 142, 146–7, 156, 159–60, 168–9.

81 GRU was the acronym for *Glavnoye razvedyvatel'noye upravleniye*, the Chief Directorate for Intelligence of the General Staff.

82 Braithwaite, *Afgantsy*, 126–7.

83 See, for example, Kucherova, *KGB v Afganistane*, 221–2, 230–4.

84 Ibid., 29.

85 Malevanyy, *Sovetskiy spetsnaz*, 212, 217, 235.

86 Ibid., 218.

87 Khristoforov, *KGB SSSR v Afganistane*, 37–8.
88 Ro'i, *Islam in the Soviet Union*, 425.
89 See, for example, Snegirev and Samunin, *Virus*, 407, 432.
90 Ro'i, *Islam in the Soviet Union*, 358–9, referring to a report on religious affairs to the CPSU Central Committee, dated 16 September 1983. The term Wahhabi was from about this time adopted by local theologians, ordinary believers and, eventually, those in the state structures as well, after which the term – following the dissolution of the Soviet Union – was turned into a derogatory categorization.
91 Sulton Khamadov, Mezhdunarodnyy kontekst: Afganskiy faktor, in Lena Jonson, Saodat Olimova and Musaffar Olimov (eds.), *Religioznyy ekstremizm v Tsentral'noy Asii: Problemy i perspektivy—Materialy konferentsii Dushanbe, 25 aprelya 2002 g.* (Dushanbe: Devashtich, 2002), 132–50, here 138.
92 Ahmed Rashid, *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 97, 98.
93 Davlat Nazirov, Political Islam in Central Asia: Its Sources and Development Stages, *Central Asia and the Caucasus* 4/22 (2003), 154–62, here 159.
94 *Washington Times*, 23 April 1987; Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, *Afghanistan: The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower* (Havertown, PA: Casemate, 1992, 2001), 189–206; Rashid, *Jihad*, 43–4, 97–8.
95 Rashid, *Jihad*, 43–4, 97–8.

TERRORISM IN THE COLD WAR

State Support in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Sphere of Influence

Edited by
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I.B. TAURIS
LONDON • NEW YORK • OXFORD • NEW DELHI • SYDNEY

I.B. TAURIS
Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK
1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA

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First published in Great Britain 2021

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A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

ISBN: HB: 978-0-7556-0023-6
ePDF: 978-0-7556-0025-0
eBook: 978-0-7556-0024-3

Typeset by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

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